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Abstract:	In	Valuing	Health,	Dan	Hausman	argues	that	well-being	is	not	measurable,	at	least	not	in	the	way	that	science	and	policy	would	require.	His	argument	depends	on	a	demanding	conception	of	well-being	and	on	a	pessimistic	verdict	upon	the	existing	measures	of	subjective	well-being.	Neither	of	these	reasons,	I	argue,	warrant	as	much	skepticism	as	Hausman	professes.				Introduction1		Dan	Hausman’s	Valuing	Health	is	a	landmark	text	in	philosophy	of	health,	philosophy	of	social	science	and	political	philosophy.	Its	novelty	and	importance	is	to	show	the	value	of	engaging	all	three	of	these	projects	at	once,	especially	when	this	is	done	with	Dan’s	characteristic	depth	and	thoroughness.	This	formula	of	philosophical	research	is	here	to	stay.			The	individual	arguments	of	this	book	are	also	very	important.	Hausman’s	main	goal	in	the	book	is	to	challenge	the	reigning	paradigm	of	measurement	of	health	by	its	contribution	to	individual	well-being,	and	to	sketch	an	alternative.	On	the	view	he	advocates	healthcare	allocation	is	a	matter	of	the	public	instead	of	the	private	value	of	health:	public	value	requires	a	special	public	justification,	a	justification	that	goes	beyond	the	benefits	of	health	to	the	individual.	This	paradigm-shifting	argument	will	deservedly	receive	the	lion	share	of	attention	and	likely	set	the	agenda	for	philosophy	of	public	health	for	years	to	come.		One	premise	of	this	argument	is	that	well-being	is	not	measurable.	This	premise,	which	is	my	focus	here,	is	not	actually	essential	to	Hausman’s	main	goal.	Those	who	reject	well-being	as	a	legitimate	political	goal	in	the	first	place,	will	agree	that	access	to	healthcare	should	not	depend	on	its	importance	for	well-being,	whether	or	not	well-being	is	measurable.	Yet	that	is	not	the	route	Hausman	takes.	For	him	non-measurability	of	well-being	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	it	should	not	be	the	basis	of	valuation	of	health.		And	even	if	this	premise	did	not	feature	in	his	argument,	it	warrants	attention.	If	well-being	is	not	measurable,	that	is	a	big	deal	both	for	science	and	for	politics.	On	the	political	side,	if	the	property	of	well-being	is	not	a	proper	quantity,	then	it	is	harder	to	use	it	as	a	benchmark	for	evaluating	policy	proposals.		On	the	scientific	side,	it	spells	doom	for	the	ambitious	and	newly	resurgent	project	of	investigating	causes	and																																																									1	I	would	like	to	thank	two	anonymous	referees,	James	Wilson,	Stephen	John	and	the	participants	of	the	June	2015	Valuing	Health	Workshop	at	University	College	London.	
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consequences	of	well-being.	In	my	estimation	Hausman’s	challenge	to	measurement	of	well-being	is	the	most	compelling	there	is.2	Moreover	it	comes	at	the	right	time	as	medical	professionals	are	also	raising	doubts	about	the	well-being	agenda	that	has	entered	into	public	health	and	clinical	research	in	recent	decades.3	If	Hausman	and	other	skeptics	are	right,	then	this	well-being	agenda	is	due	for	retirement.		Hausman’s	argument,	which	he	makes	in	chapters	6-11	of	Valuing	Health	and	which	I	reconstruct	in	Section	I	of	this	essay,	is	roughly	that	well-being	is	too	person-relative	to	measure	reliably.	Less	roughly,	he	relies	first	on	some	a	priori	considerations	about	the	concept	of	well-being	–	it	is	a	concept	that	calls	for	aggregation	of	goods	in	a	person’s	life	in	a	way	that	is	duly	sensitive	to	who	this	person	is.	Secondly,	Hausman	is	skeptical	that	the	existing	measures	of	well-being	–	whether	focused	on	feelings	of	happiness,	or	life	satisfaction	–	aggregate	all	the	well-being	relevant	goods	in	a	way	that	respects	individuality,	while	also	allowing	for	population-level	generalizations.	Comparing	and	ranking	well-being	states	is	possible	albeit	hard	on	an	individual	level,	Hausman	concedes,	but	becomes	largely	unrealistic	on	societal	level.			My	claim	here	is	that	this	argument	does	not	doom	the	project	of	measurement	of	well-being.	In	Section	II	I	explore	two	avenues	for	resistance.	I	start	by	noting	that	well-being	as	a	concept	has	multiple	meanings.	Given	this	multiplicity	we	could	question	whether	Hausman’s	demanding	sense	of	well-being	that	calls	for	a	comprehensive	aggregation	of	all	goods	over	the	course	of	one	individual’s	life	is	the	right	notion	for	science	and	policy.	Second,	we	could	put	pressure	on	Hausman’s	critique	of	existing	measures.	To	undermine	these	measures	Hausman	gives	intuitively	plausible	reasons	why	they	should	fail	to	capture	well-being.	But	these	intuitions	can	be	very	compelling	and	still	fail	to	undermine	a	measurement	tool	if	this	tool	systematically	behaves	in	reliable	ways	consistent	with	empirical	knowledge	of	factors	surrounding	well-being.	The	latter	is	the	conceit	behind	construct	validation,	the	main	approach	to	evaluating	measures	in	social	and	medical	sciences,	which	Hausman	does	not	discuss	and	which,	I	expect,	most	practitioners	will	appeal	to	in	reply	to	him.		Although	Hausman’s	skeptical	verdict	is	not	warranted	on	the	basis	of	reasons	he	gives,	his	challenge	is	a	deep	one	and	unlikely	to	go	away.	At	the	end	of	the	day,	
																																																								2	Recent	discussions	of	the	empirical	study	of	well-being	bypass	Hausman’s	concerns.	Angner	2013	argues	that	data	from	self-reports	of	happiness	are	easily	misinterpreted	as	data	about	well-being,	without	doubting	that	well-being	itself	is	measurable.	Haybron	2008	bets	that	happiness	is	a	good	enough	proxy	for	well-being,	so	we	should	focus	on	improving	measures	of	happiness.	McClimans	and	Brown	2012	and	Hunt	1997	attack	quality	of	life	measures	in	medicine,	respectively,	for	treating	well-being	as	an	outcome	rather	than	a	process,	and	for	not	giving	a	clear	definition	of	quality	of	life.	These	latter	arguments	perhaps	echo	Hausman’s	concerns.			3	England’s	Chief	Medical	Officer’s	2014	report	is	the	most	recent	example	of	the	pushback	(Davies	2014).	Older	critiques	are	Hobart	et	al	2007	and	Hunt	1997.	
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whether	well-being	is	measurable	depends	on	how	flexible	we	are	willing	to	be	about	what	counts	as	well-being	and	what	counts	as	valid	measurement.				I:	Hausman’s	case	against	measurability	of	well-being		Hausman	puts	forward	his	case	in	the	context	of	exploring	whether	health	should	be	valued	by	its	contribution	to	well-being	–	a	question	essential	for	deciding	how	a	community	should	allocate	its	scarce	resources	for	healthcare.	How	bad	is	it	to	have	a	broken	ankle?	A	natural	answer	is	that	a	broken	ankle	is	as	bad	as	the	resulting	loss	of	well-being	of	this	ankle’s	owner.	This	is	the	view	that	Hausman	will	eventually	reject.	(See	chapter	12	for	a	summary	of	reasons).	One	of	his	grounds	is	that	a	broken	ankle	can	have	a	dramatically	different	impact	on	a	person’s	well-being	depending	on	who	they	are.	In	Hausman’s	own	case,	a	broken	ankle	enabled	him	to	write	this	book.	Such	fine-grained	heterogeneity	cannot	be	accommodated	by	any	realistic	population-level	healthcare	policy.	This,	among	other	reasons,	is	why	communities	need	to	look	for	an	allocation	rule	that	isn’t	based	on	well-being.	As	we	shall	see	shortly,	independently	of	healthcare	concerns,	heterogeneity	is	the	main	obstacle	to	well-being	measurement	more	generally.		In	order	to	make	an	argument	against	measurability	of	well-being,	Hausman	first	needs	to	say	at	least	in	broad	terms	what	well-being	is.	Although	he	does	not	articulate	a	full	theory,	the	outlines	are	clear	enough.	Hausman	believes	that	any	account	of	well-being	should	accommodate	the	following	constraints	(121-124)4:		 1. Well-being	consists	in	several	goods,	not	one.		2. “What	is	good	for	me	depends	heavily	on	who	I	am”	(121),	that	is,	an	agent’s	well-being	depends	on	this	agent’s	goals,	values	and	identity.		3. 	“In	assessing	well-being	we	think	primarily	of	whole	lives,	and	our	appraisal	of	how	well	someone’s	life	is	going	during	a	limited	periods	often	depends	on	what	their	life	is	like	before	or	after”(122).			4. Well-being	is	holistic	in	that	adding	more	of	some	valuable	good	does	not	necessarily	improve	the	whole.	It’s	the	combination	that	matters	(124).		Hausman	is	well	aware	that	this	conception	is	not	entirely	uncontroversial.	Hedonists,	for	instance,	argue	that	there	is	only	one	non-instrumental	good	–	positive	mental	states.	If	well-being	is	directly	measurable,	these	states	are	the	only	things	that	need	measurement.	Hausman	does	not	hide	his	rejection	of	hedonism,	and	indeed	of	the	other	major	theory,	subjectivism5	–	neither	bare	feelings,	nor	the	fulfillment	of	desires	or	goals	capture	what	it	is	to	live	well.	In																																																									4	For	Hausman	these	constraints	illustrate	the	contrast	between	well-being	and	health,	but	this	is	not	critical	for	my	purposes.	5	In	Dale	Dorsey’s	recent	characterization	“subjectivism	about	well-being	holds	that	ϕ	is	intrinsically	good	for	x	if	and	only	if,	and	to	the	extent	that,	ϕ	is	valued,	under	the	proper	conditions,	by	x”	(Dorsey	2012,	author’s	emphasis).	Subjectivists	then	argue	about	the	nature	of	these	proper	conditions	and	about	what	valuing	should	consist	in.	
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chapter	11	he	lays	his	cards	on	the	table	and	backs	a	theory	of	well-being	based	on	flourishing,	aligning	his	views	closely	to	those	of	Richard	Kraut	(2007):		A	fundamental	evaluation	of	the	value	of	some	property	or	state	of	affairs	for	an	individual	depends	on	how	the	things	that	make	human	lives	good	(such	as	friendship,	happiness,	health,	or	a	sense	of	purpose)	are	integrated	into	the	dynamic	structure	of	that	individual’s	life.	What	Kraut	and	I	call	“flourishing”	consists	in	the	dynamic	coherent	integrations	of	objective	goods	into	an	identity.	Well-being	is	flourishing.	(141)		To	argue	that	flourishing	is	not	measurable,	Hausman	relies	on	a	plausible	conception	of	measurement	–	existence	and	epistemic	access	to	a	numerical	scale	that	enables	comparisons	of	all	well-being	states	across	and	within	persons,	and	the	distances	between	these	states	(Hausman’s	Section	4.3).	This	is	known	as	an	interval	scale.	Now	it	is	easy	to	see	how	the	case	against	measurability	would	go.	Different	people’s	flourishing	is	made	up	of	different	goods	that	combine	in	unique	ways	depending	on	their	place	in	people’s	lives.	No	single	scale	applicable	to	all	persons	can	capture	the	success	of	such	unique	combinations,	so	comparisons,	let	alone	on	an	interval	scale,	are	hopeless.		Hausman	rehearses	this	argument	but	then	recoils	from	its	extreme	skepticism.	It	is	clear	that	sometimes	comparisons	are	possible	and	very	compelling	–	it	is	better	not	to	die	very	young	and	not	to	become	a	child	soldier,	he	agrees	(125).	It	is	equally	true	that	sometimes	feelings	and	preferences	are	decent	guides	to	how	well	we	are	doing.		Adherents	of	idealized	subjectivism	hold	that	were	an	agent	to	form	desires	in	light	of	full	knowledge	and	with	no	mistakes	in	reasoning,	these	desires	would	be	authoritative	about	what	is	good	for	this	agent.	Hausman	is	not	a	subjectivist	but	he	helps	himself	to	the	idea	that	some	preferences	are	more	authoritative	than	others.	In	particular	preferences	can	reliably	indicate	flourishing	when	these	preferences	are	laundered	in	the	right	way	(Section	10.4).	Laundered	preferences	are	those	held	by	individuals	who	are	“(1)	self-interested,	(2)	well-informed,	(3)	evaluatively	competent,	and	(4)	free	of	deliberative	defects,	and	if	(5)	they	have	complete	and	transitive	preferences	among	all	alternatives”	(132).	When	cases	are	sufficiently	clear-cut	or	when	preferences	are	sufficiently	laundered,	comparisons,	even	measurement,	are	possible.		This	allowance	notwithstanding,	Hausman	still	ends	up	with	a	skeptical	conclusion	albeit	less	extreme.	The	reality	in	science	and	in	public	policy	is	that	hard	cases	abound:	who	should	get	the	scare	resources	–	the	ones	with	broken	ankles	or	the	mildly	depressed?	Plus	the	indirect	measures	of	well-being	–	happiness-based,	or	preference-based	–	are	very	poor	at	their	task.			Hausman	comes	down	especially	hard	against	subjective	well-being	measures	so	popular	in	today’s	psychology	and	behavioral	economics.	On	this	methodology	people	are	either	asked	to	judge	their	overall	satisfaction	with	life	–	an	invitation	to	express	their	satisfaction	with	all	things	important	to	them	and	then	integrate	these	considerations	into	a	summary	judgment.	Or	alternatively,	psychologists	gauge	subjects’	positive	and	negative	affect,	calculating	the	net	affect	using	some	
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averaging	rule.	About	life	satisfaction	Hausman	complains	that	people’s	reports	are	unreliable	and	sensitive	to	irrelevant	details	(9.2	and	129).	On	net	affect,	Hausman	notes	that	these	measures	count	all	emotions	equally.	He	asks	who	decides	how	net	affect	is	calculated	–	why	should	my	sadness	at	reading	international	news	count	for	as	much	as	my	sadness	at	losing	a	grandparent?	“Heterogeneity	goes	all	the	way	down	to	feelings”	(129),	he	insists.	Together	these	considerations	show	in	his	view	that	relying	on	subjective	evaluation	is	too	risky,	because	the	precise	impact	of	the	quality	of	subjective	experience	for	overall	well-being	is	a	personal	matter.		Preferences,	especially	the	laundered	ones,	would	be	in	a	better	shape,	IF	they	were	measured.	But	the	fact	is	that	standard	economic	methodology	either	infers	preferences	from	choices	people	make	(that’s	the	revealed	preference	approach)	or	else	from	their	responses	to	questionnaires	about	what	state	of	affairs	they	would	prefer	and	at	what	rate	(that’s	the	stated	preference	approach).	Neither	approach	makes	an	effort	to	select	among	these	choices	or	stated	preferences	only	the	authoritative	ones.			Here	then	is	Hausman’s	tempered	skeptical	conclusion:		 Our	evaluative	abilities	are	limited	with	respect	to	our	own	lives,	and	the	limits	to	those	abilities	imply	limits	to	the	completeness	of	our	rankings	of	alternatives.	It	will	often	be	the	case	that	the	objective	of	enhancing	people’s	well-being	does	not	discriminate	among	alternatives.		As	a	practical	matter,	policy-makers	will	need	other	ways	of	comparing	alternatives,	and	as	a	theoretical	matter,	either	one	has	to	conclude	that	prudence	and	ethics	are	less	discriminating	than	previously	thought	or	that	normative	notions	other	than	well-being	must	play	a	large	role.	(142)		It	is	a	tempered	conclusion	in	that	Hausman	allows	for	uncontroversial	comparisons	of	starkly	different	well-being	states	in	individual	cases	–	it	is	indeed	better	for	him	to	lead	the	life	he	leads	than	to	have	become	a	child	soldier.	But	in	general	these	rankings	will	not	be	possible.	We	might	formalize	his	argument	as	follows:		
Premise	1:	Well-being,	being	an	inclusive	good,	allows	for	much	heterogeneity	in	how	component	goods	are	integrated.	
Premise	2:	The	existing	measures	are	at	best	fallible	indicators	that	do	not	respect	heterogeneity	of	well-being.	
Premise	3:	Policy-relevant	measures	require	a	systematic	population-level	connection	between	well-being	and	the	indicators.	
Conclusion:	Therefore	well-being	is	not	measurable	for	policy	purposes.		The	power	of	Hausman’s	argument	is	that,	his	endorsement	of	flourishing	notwithstanding,	it	does	not	actually	depend	on	this	precise	theory	of	well-being	and	can	be	accepted	by	at	least	some	hedonists	and	subjectivists.			
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Premise	1	can	be	read	as	concerning	instrumental	goods	and	no	theorists	of	well-being	denies	that	there	are	several	such	goods	and	nor	that	these	goods	can	be	good	indicators	of	well-being.			Premise	2	is	also	open	to	hedonists.	Consider	the	hedonist	who	believes	only	in	one	single	non-instrumental	good	–	enjoyment,	but	rejects	the	possibility	of	objective	measurement	of	enjoyment	as	envisaged	by	Jeremy	Bentham	in	the	eighteenth	century	and	revived	by	some	social	scientists	today.	Such	a	measure	is	usually	represented	by	a	graph	where	x-axis	represents	time,	y-axis	represents	intensity.	The	total	enjoyment	is	the	area	under	the	curve	composed	of	ratings	of	intensity	at	an	instant.6		Rejecting	this	picture,	Roger	Crisp,	a	modern	hedonist,	argues	that	the	trade-offs	between	different	enjoyable	experiences	implied	by	this	classic	approach	are	incompatible	with	Millian	high	quality	pleasures	which,	in	his	view,	can	and	should	be	respected	by	hedonism	(Crisp	2006).	That	an	agent	can	judge	enjoyability	of	an	experience	in	a	way	that	diverges	from	the	product	of	intensity	and	duration,	is	Crisp’s	way	of	accommodating	heterogeneity	of	agents	that	Hausman	is	so	keen	on.	So	his	is	an	example	of	hedonism	about	well-being	that	is	not	committed	to	existing	measures.	Similarly,	there	could	well	be	hedonists	(or	partial	hedonists)	who	believe	that	shape	of	life	matters	in	a	way	that	makes	it	impossible	to	evaluate	enjoyment	at	a	time	without	considering	the	rest	of	the	person’s	life.	If	enjoyability	of	an	experience	is	time-dependent	in	a	way	that’s	sensitive	to	individuals’	identities,	a	hedonist	can	again	endorse	the	first	two	premises.7		Similarly	it	is	open	to	subjectivists	to	share	Hausman’s	concerns	about	current	measures	expressed	in	Premise	2.	Subjectivists	would	presumably	require	that	measures	of	well-being	gauge	the	extent	to	which	agents’	most	important	priorities	formed	under	the	right	conditions	are	fulfilled.	This	is	a	tall	order.	Existing	measures	do	not	get	at	considered	(or	laundered)	preferences.	Merely	asking	people	what	they	prefer	and	at	what	rate,	or	merely	observing	their	actual	choices	in	the	marketplace	as	most	economists	do,	likely	fails	to	detect	the	sort	of	authoritative	judgments	about	deep	values	that	subjectivists	are	after.	Recently	economists	have	started	exploring	creative	ways	to	measure	considered	preferences	through	judgments	and	choices	people	make	in	carefully	selected	circumstances	that	plausibly	reveal	their	genuine	priorities	–	for	example	when	medical	students	weigh	the	pros	and	cons	of	different	residency	programs	and	give	reasons	for	their	choices	(Benjamin	et	al	2014).	I	suspect	these	scholars	would	argue	they	are	measuring	what	Hausman	calls	laundered	preferences.	Hausman	does	not	discuss	such	attempts	but	I	would	anticipate	him	pointing	out	that	health	poses	special	challenges	to	preference-based	measures	–	on	what	grounds	would	an	agent	make	a	laundered	preference	about	the	relative	value	of	broken	ankle	versus	mild	depression?		Like	Hausman,	subjectivists	too	may	not	be	in	a	hurry	to	endorse	these	new	measures:	it	is	one	thing	to	get	people	to	form	thoughtful	preferences	about	residency	programs,	but	whether	these																																																									6	An	operationalization	of	this	approach	is	described	in	Kahneman	1999,	which	he	calls	‘objective	happiness’	to	distinguish	it	from	happiness	as	judged	by	the	individual	retrospectively.	7	I	thank	Ben	Bradley	and	Ben	Bramble	for	clarifying	this	point	for	me.	
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preferences	are	sufficiently	close	to	the	fully	informed	and	the	fully	rational	preferences	that	idealized	subjectivists	favor	remains	an	open	question.		All	this	is	to	say	that	Hausman’s	argument	against	measurement	is	far-reaching	even	in	its	tempered	version.	It	does	not	require	an	endorsement	of	flourishing	and	would	appeal	to	anyone	who	believes	that	the	existing	(and	possibly	any	conceivable)	methods	of	measurement	of	well-being	do	a	poor	job	at	detecting	well-being	in	a	way	that	respects	differences	between	individuals.	It	is	thus	no	good	in	reply	to	Hausman	to	just	defend	hedonism	or	subjectivism,	nor	to	attack	flourishing.		How	then	could	we	argue	with	Hausman?				II:	Resisting	Hausman		I	will	explore	two	replies.	The	first	one	is	to	Premise	1	–	must	the	impossibility	of	measuring	well-being	in	its	most	demanding	sense	doom	its	measurement	in	all	cases?	The	second	response	is	aimed	at	Premise	2	–	it	takes	more	than	Hausman’s	appeals	to	implausibility	of	current	efforts	to	undermine	measures	when	these	measures	have	gone	through	a	validation	procedure.	I	take	these	replies	in	turn.		
II.1	What	should	we	mean	by	‘well-being’?	Premise	1	embodies	Hausman’s	conception	of	well-being.	It	is	a	demanding	one	–	requiring	a	complete	aggregation	of	all	important	goods	in	a	way	that	respects	the	agent’s	history,	character,	talents,	culture	and	values.	Elsewhere	I	have	argued	that,	though	this	is	one	and	perhaps	the	main	sense	of	‘well-being’,	it	is	not	the	only	one	(Alexandrova	2013).	A	long-term	personal	therapist,	a	close	friend,	or	an	obituary	writer	would	typically	focus	on	this	sort	of	all-things-considered	evaluation	either	of	a	life	or	of	a	period	of	life.	This	is	also	the	sense	on	which	philosophers	have	traditionally	focused.		But	sometimes	‘well-being’	connotes	a	less	demanding	evaluation.	A	doctor	might	be	interested	in	well-being	of	her	patients	with	a	chronic	disease,	a	teacher	–	in	well-being	of	students	from	foster	homes,	a	social	worker	–	in	well-being	of	single-parent	families,	a	development	economist	–	in	well-being	of	people	in	a	refugee	camp.	In	each	of	these	cases	well-being	is	predicated	of	a	particular	kind	of	people	in	a	specific	type	of	circumstances.	This	sort	of	evaluation	is	at	once	narrower	than	Hausman’s	–	not	all	goods	are	taken	into	account,	but	only	those	shared	by	this	group	of	people	in	these	situations.	It	is	also	broader	in	that	it	considers	a	kind	of	person	rather	than	an	individual.			This	–	let	us	call	it	contextual	–	sense	of	well-being	is	sometimes	all	that	we	mean	by	well-being.	It	is	also	the	sense	most	suitable	to	science,	policy	and	social	services	in	contemporary	bureaucracies.	A	good	social	worker	knows	a	lot	about	how	to	help	families	in	a	specific	type	of	trouble,	and	a	good	child	psychologist	often	knows	exactly	the	needs	of	the	kids	she	is	looking	after.	This	is	‘well-being’	as	studied	by	researchers	in	social	and	medical	sciences	and	about	which	implicit	
	 8	
knowledge	of	teachers,	therapists	and	social	workers	is	accumulated.	Whether	measured	formally	by	indicators	or	questionnaires,	or	eyeballed	by	an	experienced	specialist,	this	sense	of	‘well-being’	depends	on	modest	generalizations.	Here	are	some	examples:	Recently	adopted	children	benefit	from	a	period	of	intense	bonding	with	no	one	other	than	their	parents;	Caregivers	of	chronic	patients	are	at	risk	for	health	and	well-being	even	with	social	support;	Early	learning	difficulties	impact	later	well-being	more	than	other	causes.			Of	course,	if	we	focus	on	individuals	we	might	find	exceptions:	recently	adopted	toddlers	who	can	go	to	nursery	right	away,	caregivers	who	are	just	fine,	successful	adults	that	get	over	early	learning	problems.	My	claim	is	not	that	focusing	on	specific	populations	avoids	all	the	problems	that	Hausman	finds	with	well-being	measurement	(not	here	anyway).	Rather	I	claim	that	if	it	makes	sense	to	predicate	well-being	of	kinds	and	not	merely	of	individuals,	then	general	claims	about	what	is	good	for	a	given	kind	will	be	possible	too.	This	is	because	kinds	are	identified	by	the	generalizations	they	support	–	that’s	one	common	definition	of	kinds	anyhow	(Boyd	1991)	–	there	will	thus	be	generalizations	about	how	members	of	this	kind	function	in	such	and	such	circumstances.		To	the	extent	that	such	knowledge	is	possible	and	to	the	extent	that	this	knowledge	is	about	well-being	in	a	sense,	we	have	one	reply	to	Hausman.	He	selected	the	most	demanding	and	the	least	epistemically	accessible	notion	of	well-being	and	showed	an	impossibility	of	measurement	for	this	notion	based	on	intuitive	impossibility	of	making	generalizations	about	well-being.	But	this	is	too	easy.	Whether	such	generalizations	are	on	the	whole	reliable	is	an	empirical	question	that	needs	more	attention	than	I	can	give.	But	given	that	teachers,	social	workers	and	medical	professionals	routinely	make	well-being	judgments	on	the	basis	of	such	generalizations,	Hausman	owes	us	a	case	against	these	practices.	Hausman	could	retort	that	contextual	well-being	is	not	true	well-being.	It	is	perhaps	quality	of	life,	or	performance	according	to	one	indicator,	but	not	well-being	proper.	But	at	this	point	the	argument	has	shifted	into	an	unhelpful	territory	about	who	is	entitled	to	the	term	‘well-being’.	Erring	on	the	side	of	liberality,	it	is	at	least	permissible	to	maintain,	pace	Hausman,	that	there	is	more	to	evaluation	than	judging	individual	lives	all	things	considered.		Still,	even	allowing	for	well-being	in	this	contextual	sense,	what	confidence	should	we	have	in	the	existing	methods	of	its	measurement?	It	is	not	enough	to	show	that	Hausman’s	argument	is	premised	on	too	demanding	of	a	notion.	That	merely	shows	that	there	are	other	notions	which	apply	to	kinds	and	since	kinds	are	based	on	generalizations,	these	contextual	notions	are	better	candidates	for	measurement.	That	secures	potential	measurability	of	contextual	well-being.	But	to	address	Premise	2	we	also	need	to	show	that	measurement	of	contextual	well-being	is	in	actual	fact	realistic	and	defensible	or	more	so	than	Hausman	maintains.			
II.2	Are	current	measures	that	bad?			
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Evaluating	the	validity	of	existing	measures	of	contextual	well-being	is	a	big	job	which	I	could	not	possibly	complete	in	this	essay.	But	I	can	offer	reasons	to	withhold	judgment	on	Hausman’s	skeptical	verdict.	Against	these	measures	Hausman	offers	insufficient	evidence	–	a	mixture	of	appeals	to	intuition	and	unsystematic	references	to	studies	that	expose	problems	in	one	or	another	questionnaire.	But	the	field	of	social	and	medical	measurement	has	elaborate	procedures	for	validation,	some	of	which	I	will	describe	below.	These	procedures	despite	being	well	established	remain	controversial,	so	my	argument	is	not	‘had	Hausman	examined	them,	he	would	be	more	optimistic	about	measurement	of	well-being’.	I	myself	am	more	optimistic	but	I	cannot	make	a	full	case	for	such	optimism	here.	Rather	my	claim	is	that	evaluating	current	measures	of	well-being	takes	more	than	appeals	to	intuition.			If	you	asked	a	social	scientist	why	they	use	a	given	measure	of	well-being,	their	answer	would	probably	invoke	a	process	known	as	psychometric	validation.8	The	psychometric	tradition	in	the	social	sciences	has	traditionally	specialized	in	developing	tests	and	questionnaires	for	detecting	unobservable	attributes	(called	‘constructs’)	such	as	intelligence,	personality	and	lately	well-being.	Some	of	the	measurement	tools	and	their	use	in	research	on	race,	gender	and	class,	especially	in	the	early	20th	century,	attracted	much	controversy.	The	eugenic	roots	of	this	work	are	dutifully	and	solemnly	acknowledged	in	the	introductory	courses	to	psychometrics.9	But	for	virtually	all	researchers	who	want	to	measure	an	attribute	on	the	basis	of	people’s	reports	or	performances	in	tests,	psychometric	validation	remains	the	obligatory	procedure.10	Large	swaths	of	the	science	of	well-being	in	particular	have	embraced	questionnaires	and	with	that	psychometric	validation.11	Since	measures	of	life	satisfaction	are	one	of	Hausman’s	targets	I	will	describe	their	validation	below.		The	famous	Satisfaction	With	Life	Scale	(SWLS)	is	a	five-item	questionnaire	which	elicits	judgments	about	life	as	a	whole	(for	example,	item	three	is	“I	am	satisfied	with	my	life”	1=strongly	disagree,	7=strongly	agree).	The	process	of	its	validation	is	described	in	the	much	cited	article	by	Ed	Diener	and	his	colleagues	(Diener	et	al	1985).	They	started	with	forty-eight	items	all	inviting	reports	of	satisfaction	with	life,	and	positive	and	negative	affect.	Questions	about	affect	were	eliminated	first	because	life	satisfaction,	researchers	judged,	is	a	judgment	about	one’s	life	as	a	whole,	not	a	report	of	emotions.	This	left	them	with	ten	items,	five	of	which	were	eliminated	because	of	‘semantic	similarity’.		During	the	validation	stage,	176	undergraduates	psychologists	in	University	of	Illinois	took	the	test	twice	with	an	interval	of	two	months.	This	produced	the	data	that																																																									8	The	rest	of	this	section	uses	some	material	from	Alexandrova	and	Haybron	(Forthcoming).		9	For	a	brief	history	of	the	first	psychometrics	laboratory	see	http://www.psychometrics.cam.ac.uk/about-us/our-history/first-psychometric-laboratory	.	10	DeVet	et	al	2011	is	a	textbook	for	development	and	validation	of	measures	in	this	tradition.	11	See	Angner	2011	for	the	place	of	psychometric	validation	in	the	current	science	of	well-being,	especially	vis-à-vis	the	welfare	economics	tradition.	
	 10	
allowed	Diener	and	his	colleagues	to	judge,	among	other	things,	the	ability	of	each	item	to	predict	the	overall	score	(a	property	called	internal	consistency).	This	exercise	showed	that	questions	about	life	satisfaction	elicit	reliable	responses.	But	do	these	responses	have	anything	to	do	with	well-being?	This	is	when	construct	validation	enters	the	picture.		Construct	validation	purports	to	ensure	that	the	measure	of	the	construct	in	question	behaves	exactly	as	it	should	given	researchers’	background	knowledge.		On	the	original	proposal	formulated	in	the	classic	paper	1955	by	Cronbach	and	Meehl,	construct	validation	consists	in	testing	the	nomological	network	of	hypotheses	in	the	neighborhood	of	the	construct	(Cronbach	and	Meehl	1955).	To	measure	X,	we	need	to	know	how	X	behaves	in	relation	to	other	properties	and	processes	that	are	systematically	connected	with	it	by	law-like	regularities.	Among	psychologists	the	consensus	seems	to	be	that	construct	validity	is	the	true	validity,	encompassing	all	other	validities	such	as	criterion,	predictive,	discriminant,	content	(Strauss	and	Smith	2009).			SWLS,	according	to	its	authors,	earned	construct	validity	when	Diener	and	his	colleagues	compared	responses	on	the	SWLS	to	responses	on	other	existing	measures	of	subjective	well-being	and	related	constructs	such	as	affect,	happiness	and	domain	satisfaction.	The	findings	confirmed	their	expectation	that	SWLS	scores	correlate	sufficiently	well	with	those	measures	that	also	elicit	a	judgment	on	subjective	well-being	and	less	so	with	measures	that	focus	only	on	affect	or	self-esteem	or	other	related	but	distinct	notions.	In	the	final	stage	of	testing,	the	SWLS	scores	of	fifty-three	elderly	people	from	the	Urbana-Champaign	area	were	compared	to	ratings	this	same	population	received	in	a	structured	in-depth	interview	that	focused	on	“the	extent	to	which	they	remained	active	and	were	oriented	toward	self-directed	learning”(Diener	et	al	1985,	73).	Once	the	interview	results	were	converted	into	a	single	score,	this	score	was	found	to	have	.43	correlation	with	the	SWLS,	an	‘adequate’	correlation	by	the	standards	of	the	discipline.		Since	1985	SWLS	has	been	and	continues	to	be	scrutinized	for	its	agreement	with	the	growing	data	about	subjective	well-being.	Individual	judgments	of	life	satisfaction	have	been	checked	against	the	reports	of	informants	close	to	the	subjects	(Schneider	and	Schimmack	2009).	Proponents	of	SWLS	argue	that	it	exhibits	a	plausible	relationship	with	money,	relationships,	suicide,	satisfaction	with	various	domains	of	life,	such	as	work	and	living	conditions.12		Of	course,	scientists	readily	admit	that	validation	is	a	continuous	process,	that	it	is	never	strictly	speaking	over	and	that	measures	need	to	be	revalidated	for	each	new	environment	in	which	they	are	used.	Validation	of	the	SWLS	described	above	did	not	stop	many	skeptics	raising	questions	about	the	relation	between	life	satisfaction	and	actual	subjective	well-being.	Critics	were	keen	to	show	that	life	satisfaction	judgments	are	ad	hoc	constructions	that	sway	with	arbitrary	changes	in	the	environment,	such	as	finding	a	coin	right	before	the	test																																																									12	See	Diener	et	al	2008,	74-93	for	summary	and	references.	Haybron	2008	presents	a	case	against	life	satisfaction	as	a	measure	of	well-being	in	chapter	5.	
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(Schwartz	and	Strack	1999).	These	are	the	criticisms	that	Hausman	invokes	against	life	satisfaction	(110).	He	neglects	to	mention,	however,	the	lengths	to	which	psychologists	have	gone	to	check	whether	life	satisfaction	judgments	are	quite	as	fragile.	It	turns	out	that	they	aren’t,	and	today	SWLS	continues	to	be	popular	partly	because	these	judgments	are	more	robust	than	its	critics	alleged	(Oishi	et	al	2003,	Lucas	2013).		The	story	of	validation	of	SWLS	is	fairly	typical.	All	the	questionnaire-based	measured	of	health-related	quality	of	life,	flourishing,	emotional	state	go	through	a	similar	process.13	I	recount	this	story	in	detail	to	emphasize	that	most	measures	of	well-being	are	not	selected	purely	on	the	basis	of	their	intuitive	appeal	to	the	scholars	who	put	them	forward.14	They	are	validated	according	to	a	principle	that	forms	the	backbone	of	psychometric	methodology:	“To	determine	whether	a	measure	is	useful,	one	must	conduct	empirical	tests	that	examine	whether	the	measure	behaves	as	would	be	expected	given	the	theory	of	the	underlying	construct”(Diener	et	al	2008,	67).	This	is	a	broadly	coherentist	philosophy	according	to	which	a	good	measure	of	a	phenomenon	is	validated	against	other	fallible	measures	of	it	or	against	fallible	measures	of	related	phenomena.	In	this	sense	it	is	a	familiar	story	for	historians	and	philosophers	of	measurement.15				I	suspect	that	Hausman	would	welcome	attention	to	psychometric	validation.	But	does	this	methodology	offer	a	solution	to	his	heterogeneity	problem,	which	to	remind,	stems	from	the	fact	that	different	people	place	different	values	on	the	goods	picked	out	in	well-being	questionnaires?	Potentially	yes.	If	a	questionnaire	really	does	agree	with	all	of	the	relevant	background	knowledge	as	construct	validation	aspires	to	ensure,	then	the	mere	intuition	that	this	questionnaire	could	go	wrong	in	some	individual	case	remains	just	that,	an	intuition.	I	imagine	that	believers	in	construct	validation	would	reply	to	Hausman’s	worries	in	just	this	way	–	‘we	will	only	worry	about	heterogeneity	if	the	data	indicate	that	our	questionnaires	do	not	behave	as	they	should.’			This	is	a	fine	response	as	far	as	it	goes.	But	in	actual	fact	construct	validation	does	not	live	up	to	its	great	ambition	to	check	questionnaires	against	all	the	relevant	knowledge.	Often	questionnaires	are	generated	and	validated	in	a	mechanical	way	that	ignores	the	meaning	and	normative	roles	of	concepts	such																																																									13	This	is	not	strictly	speaking	true.	There	are	many	different	approaches	to	validation	(classical,	item-response	theory,	Rasch	etc).	But	SWLS’s	story	is	largely	typical	for	psychology	of	well-being.	See	Diener	et	al	2010	for	a	recent	example	of	validation	of	happiness	and	flourishing	measures	using	roughly	the	same	methods.	14	I	say	‘most’	because	the	affect-based	measures	of	happiness	(see	footnote	6)	were	not,	to	my	knowledge,	validated	in	this	way.	Rather	their	justification	is	a	mixture	of	critique	of	life	satisfaction	and	derivation	from	axioms	(see	Kahneman	1999	for	further	references).	15	Chang	2004	describes	the	process	of	development	of	measures	of	temperature	in	coherentist	terms;	van	Fraassen	2008	also	emphasizes	a	co-evolution	of	measurement	and	theory.	
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as	happiness	and	well-being	(Alexandrova	and	Haybron	forthcoming).	For	example,	construct	validation	can	fail	to	take	into	account	the	phenomenon	of	
response	shift.16	Response	shift	occurs	when	the	meaning	of	subject’s	evaluation	changes	due	to	a	change	in	their	values	or	adjustment	to	new	personal	circumstances.	This	is	a	case	of	heterogeneity,	albeit	intra-personal	rather	than	inter-personal.	Medical	researchers	are	concerned	about	response	shift	because	it	is	documented	in	subjects	whose	health	status	changes,	for	example,	with	a	sudden	onset	of	disability	(Schwartz	et	al	2007,	Schwartz	and	Spranger	1999).	When	patients	reconceive	their	lives	in	response	to	new	obstacles	or	opportunities,	a	well-being	questionnaire	validated	by	the	standard	methods	will	not	necessarily	pick	out	this	change.	McClimans	and	co-authors	argue	that	this	can	be	a	failure	of	validity	(McClimans	et	al	2013).		So	Hausman’s	concern	about	heterogeneity	might	well	reappear	even	when	the	focus	is	on	contextual	well-being	and	even	when	measures	have	passed	the	conventional	tests	of	psychometric	validation.	Nevertheless	a	sweeping	skeptical	verdict	of	the	kind	he	reaches	in	this	book	is	not	warranted	on	the	basis	of	reasons	he	provides.17	Heterogeneity	is	a	fact	of	life,	and	a	well	known	one	to	the	researchers,	but	whether	it	shuts	the	door	on	measurement	is	a	far	more	complicated	question	than	Hausman	allows.	My	own	bet	is	that	there	will	be	pockets	of	valid	measurement	provided	careful	enough	application	of	existing	methods.			III.	Taking	Stock		I	have	argued	that	well-being	could	be	measurable	if	we	focus	on	contextual	rather	than	general	well-being	and	if	our	measures	behave	in	a	way	that	coheres	with	all	the	available	evidence.	Does	my	case	make	a	serious	dent	in	Hausman’s	argument?	Yes	and	no.		No,	because	I	haven’t	said	anything	to	undermine	Hausman’s	main	contention	that	well-being	in	its	most	expansive	sense	is	not	measurable	with	the	current	(nor	possibly	any)	tools.	It	is	also	plausible	that	this	general	sense	of	well-being	is	the	most	central	and	significant	to	human	life.	My	invocation	of	a	different	sense	of	well-being	–	the	contextual	sense	–	may	come	across	as	lowering	the	bar	in	a	way	that	makes	the	concept	lose	its	unifying	force	in	human	life.	If	such	a	redefinition	serves	only	the	goal	of	making	measurement	possible,	that	seems	like	putting	the	scientific	cart	before	the	philosophical	horse.		On	the	other	hand,	such	a	redefinition	happens	all	the	time	and	for	a	good	reason.	One	of	the	lessons	of	recent	work	on	history	and	philosophy	of																																																									16	I	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	suggesting	this	example.	17	Michell	1999,	another	example	of	an	overly	sweeping	verdict,	argues	that	the	very	idea	of	quantitative	scales	in	psychology	is	deeply	flawed	in	part	because	the	phenomena	in	question	are	qualities,	not	quantities.	But	most	measurement	scholars,	even	those	who	are	critical	of	psychometric	methodology,	are	less	skeptical	than	Michell	(Borsboom	2005).			
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measurement	is	that	the	theory	of	the	phenomenon	and	its	measurement	co-
evolve.	To	quote	Bas	van	Fraassen:	“The	questions	What	counts	as	a	measurement	
of	(physical	quantity)	X?	and	What	is	(that	physical	quantity)	X?	cannot	be	answered	independently	of	each	other.”	(van	Fraassen	2008,	116,	author’s	italics	preserved).	To	apply	this	insight	to	our	case,	it	is	no	good	to	decide	ahead	of	time	from	a	philosopher’s	pedestal	what	well-being	is	and	then	declare	that	no	measure	can	do	justice	to	this	notion.	The	practicalities	of	measurement,	the	need	for	common	reliable	standards	that	enable	comparisons	and	scientific	communication,	should	all	naturally	inform	the	shape	of	concepts	we	posit.	This	mutual	correction	of	scientific	requirements	and	philosophical	constraints	(plus	political	and	cultural	ones)	is	the	story	of	science.	If	well-being	is	to	play	a	useful	role	in	life	of	today’s	industrial	bureaucracies	which	live	by	numbers,	it	may	have	to	be	made	measurable	even	if	it	wasn’t	initially.			The	big	issue	–	and	one	on	which	I	anticipate	parting	ways	with	Hausman	–	is	how	much	flexibility	well-being	as	a	concept	legitimately	admits	and	how	reliably	construct	validation	can	track	differences	among	and	within	subjects.	I	hope	it	is	flexible	enough	to	apply	to	kinds	of	people	rather	than	only	to	unique	individuals,	and	flexible	enough	to	be	tractable,	at	least	sometimes,	by	judiciously	applied	measures.		 	
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